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Abstract 
Tasks that require mentally simulating events, such as remembering events from 
one’s past and imagining events from one’s future, have been shown to involve a highly 
overlapping set of brain regions. Across a growing number of studies, relatively few 
regions have been found that show differences in activity between remembered and 
imagined events. However, studies have not disambiguated neural activity related to task 
orientation (i.e., preparing to remember events from the past or imagine events in the 
future) from activity related simulating events, per se. The current experiment uses 
functional MRI and employs a catch trial design to test the hypothesis that by separating 
orientation and simulation related activity, novel differences might be found between the 
acts of remembering and imagining events. We find that regions typically shown to 
activate above baseline in simulation tasks actually deactivate slightly in response to 
orientation cues, and that by accounting for this activity, regions in bilateral 
parahippocampal and right retrosplenial cortex show increased activity for the simulation 
of past events relative to the simulation of future events. This finding suggests that 
multiple, temporally overlapping processes exist in regions involved in episodic 
simulation, and that these differences concealed a network of regions sensitive to 
situations in which information from one’s past is explicitly retrieved.  
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 A defining ability of the human mind is the capacity to recall and re-experience 
memories from one’s own past. This ability is thought to be supported by episodic 
memory, defined as memory for personal experiences, and the specific people, objects, 
and places associated with these experiences [1; 2]. In addition, it has also been 
hypothesized that this same memory system is flexible enough to enable humans to 
mentally travel forward in time to imagine themselves in the future [3], a process known 
as episodic future thought [4]. A growing body of literature from cognitive psychology, 
neuropsychology, and cognitive neuroscience has supported the hypothesis that both 
remembering the past and envisioning the future (or other hypothetical scenarios) rely on 
highly overlapping neural and cognitive mechanisms (for recent review, see [5]). While 
originally the concept of autonoetic consciousness was coined to encompass various 
forms of “mental time travel” [3], more recently the term “episodic simulation” has been 
invoked to describe projections of the self through time (e.g., [6]), and when speaking of 
both of these processes collectively, this latter term will be used throughout the rest of 
this report.  
Recent neuroimaging data regarding similarities in remembering and imagining 
 Over the past half-decade, a number of cognitive neuroscience studies have 
examined the neural correlates of episodic simulation, primarily using fMRI (e.g., [7; 8]). 
Research in this area has consistently identified a set of regions that are commonly 
engaged when one is either recalling events from one’s personal past, imagining events 
that might occur in one’s future, or even imagining other hypothetical scenarios (i.e., 
these regions appear to be commonly engaged by a variety of simulation tasks; see e.g., 
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[7-11]). These regions of overlap include ventral and dorsal portions of the medial 
prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex (extending into regions of the precuneus and 
retrosplenial cortex), bilateral superior frontal cortex, bilateral inferior parietal lobule 
(especially the angular gyrus), and bilateral hippocampal formation (for in-depth 
discussions and reviews, see [12; 13]). 
 The finding of largely overlapping regions has been accompanied by another 
consistent finding, which is a relative lack of differences that emerge when one directly 
compares activity across brain regions for episodic memory and episodic future thought. 
When such differences are found, research has consistently shown greater BOLD activity 
for episodic future thought than for remembering episodic events (for review and 
discussion, see [13]). It has been argued that greater activity related to the envisioning of 
future events reflects greater processing demands, as various elements must be combined 
across a number of disparate events, whereas for remembered events only a single, 
coherent memory trace is activated [7; 8]. 
 Conversely, no regions have been reliably shown to elicit greater activity for 
remembered events than imagined future events. This relative lack of difference is 
surprising, especially from the perspective of reality monitoring [14]: events that are 
imagined are not typically confused with events that occurred in our pasts. Yet the 
implication from contemporary neuroimaging findings appears to be that the same core 
regions are engaged, with the biomarker of “remembered” versus “imagined” events 
being signal strength in these regions (e.g., in left superior frontal gyrus [7] or right 
hippocampal formation [8]). If overall “mental effort” (as represented by level of 
activity) within a handful of regions reflects the status of remembered (i.e., ‘real’) versus 
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imagined events, one might expect more source confusion than is commonly observed, 
and therefore this possibility seems unsatisfactory. 
Existing neuroimaging approaches have combined task orientation with event 
simulation 
 The relatively few differences in activity observed between conditions of 
remembering and imagining may be attributable to the methods commonly used in 
episodic simulation research. The studies have used variants of the Galton-Crovitz word 
cueing technique [15], in which an orientation cue to directs participants to think about 
either the past or the future, and then a short word or picture “event probe” helps 
participants form some scenario. Figure 1 includes examples from several recent studies 
using this basic paradigm (specifically [7; 10]).  
 A potential limitation to using this approach is that it conflates the BOLD response 
to the orientation cue and to the event probe, and it seems important that these two 
components should be separated. It has been hypothesized by Tulving that in order to 
retrieve information from episodic memory, one must enter a specific cognitive task state, 
known as retrieval mode [2], and research since then has demonstrated that this 
preparation to retrieve information evokes a different BOLD response than does the 
retrieval itself (see e.g., [16]). Cognitive neuroscience studies that have used 
methodologies summarized in Figure 1 cannot distinguish activity related to entering this 
mental state from the activity related to simulating experiences, either remembered from 
the past or imagined in the future. Similarly, to the extent that one might have to enter a 
“future mode” task set when imagining events that might occur in one’s own future, 
current designs have not allowed a separation of activity orienting toward the future from 
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activity related specifically 
to simulation of the future 
event. It seems necessary to 
disambiguate these possibly 
different task sets from the 
simulation period following 
each one if we are to 
properly characterize 
differences that may exist between retrieving past events and imagining hypothetical 
future events. 
 It may be the case that differences exist during the orientation component of 
simulation trials (i.e., when one is adopting a specific task set), during the simulation 
component, or both. If differences exist in only one or the other component of a given 
simulation trial, combining both components into a single modeled BOLD response may 
not provide sufficient power to observe these differences. Furthermore, if one type of trial 
shows greater activity in response to task orientation, and less activity in response to the 
event probe, this effect may be “averaged out” by combining these components into a 
single response. Given these possibilities, separating orientation from event probe 
simulation components may provide novel insights into differences between the 
remembering of past events and the envisioning of events from one’s future. 
Catch trials allow separation of component processes 
 One means of separating component processes within a given trial is to incorporate 
a catch trial design [17-19]. This technique involves separating trials into two or more 
Figure 1.  Summary of previous designs of episodic simulation studies. 
Trialwise instructions consist of simultaneously providing participants with 
task orientation instructions as well as a probe to help participants 
simulate an event. Methods described are taken from [7; 10]. 
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components. To use the example from Fig. 1a, it might involve providing an orientation 
cue (e.g., “SELF-REMEMBER”) and an event probe to direct a specific simulation (e.g., 
“getting lost”). On full, or “compound,” trials, both trial components are presented. For a 
small percentage of trials, known as “catch trials”, only the initial component (in the 
current example, “SELF-REMEMBER”) is presented, after which point the trial ends. 
The addition of these catch trials enables separate modeling of orientation cue and event 
probe components of trials. This separation can provide insights into how orientation-
related (or preparatory) activity can impact event probe-related activity (for related 
discussion, see [16]). 
Summary of basic question 
 The main question we are seeking to answer in the reported experiment is whether 
novel differences between episodic memory and episodic future thought might be 
observed when neural activity during these processes is isolated from that activity 
associated with the orientation cue. By using fMRI and incorporating a catch trial design, 
we will be able to separately model the orientation and event probe components of trials. 
We will compare activity for remembered events and imagined future events associated 
with event probes (i.e., with the act of simulation events per se, rather than orientation as 
well as simulation), along with activity for a control simulation condition, in which 
participants are asked to imagine a familiar other (in this case, President Barack Obama) 
engaging in various activities. We predict that by “off-loading” the orientation-related 
activity from simulation-related activity, we will be able to detect novel differences in 
brain areas that typically demonstrate “common” activity between remember and future 
conditions in previous simulation experiments. 
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METHODS 
Participants 
 Twenty-eight young adult subjects were recruited from Washington University and 
the surrounding metro St. Louis area. One subject was excluded from analysis due to 
excessive movement, one subject was excluded due to a failure to comply with task 
instructions, and two subjects was eliminated due to a failure to reach criterion 
performance (see manipulation check below). For the remaining 24 subjects (14 female), 
ages ranged from 18 to 36 years (mean = 23.9). All participants were right-handed, native 
speakers of English, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and no reported history 
of psychiatric illness. Due to an isolated case of excessive movement, one subject had a 
single experimental run dropped from analysis. For the remaining 23 subjects, all 3 
experimental runs were included. 
 All participants were consented in accordance with the guidelines set forward by 
the Human Research Protection Office at Washington University, and were compensated 
for their time at a rate of $25/hour.  
Task stimuli 
 Stimuli consisted of 90 words and short phrases. These depicted common objects 
(e.g., board game), locations (e.g., library), and activities (e.g., visiting relatives). 
Seventy-two of these stimuli were taken from a previous laboratory study [7], and the 
other stimuli were novel and generated specifically for this experiment. Stimuli ranged in 
length from 3-22 characters in length (mean = 10.9), and organized into 6 lists of 15 
words each that were matched for word length. List order was counterbalanced across 
participants, and words within each list were randomized for each participant. Across all 
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participants, words were equally likely to appear in each experimental condition (see 
below). Since participants only saw 72 of the 90 total stimuli, the items withheld for each 
participant were counterbalanced such that each word was withheld equally often across 
all participants. All stimuli, including a fixation cross shown between task trials, were 
presented to participants in 48-point Arial font. 
Simulation task 
 Figure 2 summarizes the experimental task. Participants performed the 
experimental task across three functional runs within the fMRI scanner. In each run, 
participants were presented with a series of 24 event probes, each of which was preceded 
by a specific orientation cue. These 
orientation cues provided participants with 
specific instructions for how to probe that 
followed each one. Specifically, 
participants were instructed on a trial-by-
trial basis to either remember a specific 
event that occurred in their own past 
(“REMEMBER”), imagine a specific event 
that might occur in their own personal 
futures (“FUTURE”), or imagine President 
Obama participating in a specific event 
(“OBAMA”). President Obama was 
chosen as someone who is easily to 
imagine in a variety of situations, and is 
Figure 2. Summary of current study design. On a 
trialwise basis, participants are first provided with an 
orientation cue, describing the task they are about to 
perform. One frame later, they are given an event probe 
to help them simulate an event. On 20% of the trials, 
participants are provided only with the orientation cue. 
Plus signs represent 2.5-7.5 seconds of fixation between 
trials. 
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consistent with previous studies which have used political figures in such a manner (e.g., 
former U.S. presidents Bill Clinton [7] George Bush [20]; current German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel [21]). Participants saw each orientation cue for 2.5 seconds (1 TR) and 
during this time they were instructed to turn their attention toward thinking about the past, 
about the future, or about imagining President Obama, based on the cue with which they 
were just provided. Orientation cues were presented in the center of the screen, and 
participants were shown 30 of each type of cue. 
 Following this instruction on 80% of the experimental trials (72 total), participants 
were provided with an event probe: a short word or phrase that was meant to “help [them] 
form a given scenario mentally.” This probe was presented for 10 seconds (4 TRs), and 
during this time participants were instructed to “remember or imagine, with as much 
vividness and detail as possible, an event related to the word or phrase” that was being 
presented. It was emphasized that the event probe was meant to be helpful, and that their 
envisioned scenario did not have to related directly to the probe itself. Participants were 
given the additional instruction that each event should be unique (i.e., they should not 
think about the same event for multiple event probes), and it should be specific in time 
and place. For events in the OBAMA condition, participants were explicitly told that they 
should perform the task without consideration to the temporal context of the event (i.e., 
whether it had occurred or had yet to occur). The event probe was presented in the center 
of the screen, and no delay was introduced between orientation cue and event probe 
presentations. 
 At the end of the 10-second period in which participants were simulating each 
event, the event probe was replaced by a fixation cross that appeared in the center of the 
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screen for 2.5-7.5 seconds. Participants were instructed that upon seeing the crosshair, 
they should stop thinking about a given event, clear their mind, relax, and await 
presentation of the next orientation cue. 
 The remaining 20% of the experimental trials (18 total) consisted of catch trials 
[19]. In these trials, participants saw the orientation cues that typically preceded each 
event, but no event probe. Instead, a fixation crosshair followed the orientation cue, just 
as it would typically follow the event probe. Because the event-probes occurred at a fixed 
interval following the orientation cue during normal (“compound”) trials, these catch 
trials were used to separate the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) response 
associated with orientation cue presentation from that associated with event probe 
presentation (i.e., task-orientation signals from event simulation per se, for each 
condition). The ratio of 20% catch trials to 80% compound trials represents a 
compromise which allows enough catch trials to enable proper modeling of the 
orientation cue, while at the same time making the catch trials infrequent enough that 
they are not anticipated by participants, and is within the existing guidelines in the 
literature [18]. 
 After completing this task, participants spent approximately 20 more minutes in the 
fMRI scanner performing an unrelated recognition memory task that will not be 
discussed in this report. In addition, approximately 8 minutes of resting-state data was 
collected prior to beginning the simulation task, and these data are likewise not discussed 
in this report. 
Post-scan questionnaire 
 After exiting the scanner, participants completed a post-scan questionnaire, which 
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served as both a behavioral measurement of their phenomenological experiences, as well 
as a manipulation check. Subjects were re-presented with all of the event probes and the 
orientation cues associated with each probe, and were asked to make Likert-type ratings 
(1-4 scale) for each on several phenomenological characteristics.  Specifically, subjects 
were asked to give a rating for vividness (4 = “most vivid), familiarity of scene in which 
the simulation was set (4 = “most familiar”), and difficulty in forming the scenario 
mentally (4 = “most difficult”). Previous studies using similar paradigms (e.g. [13]) have 
shown that subjects can reliably report such ratings after leaving the scanner. Subjects 
were also instructed to indicate, for each event, whether or not they were able to form a 
scenario mentally. We used this information for our manipulation check (see next 
section). Finally subjects were asked to provide detailed descriptions of three randomly 
selected events of each type (REMEMBER, FUTURE, OBAMA).  
Manipulation check 
 Subjects who were unable to form scenarios for over 10% of the event probes were 
excluded from analysis. In addition, if the detailed descriptions provided by participants 
indicated that they did not follow task-instructions (e.g., if they did not constrain their 
scenarios to specific times and places), the participants were also excluded from analysis. 
As noted in the Participants section, two subjects were excluded was excluded for failing 
to meet these performance criteria, and one was excluded for failing to follow task-
instructions. 
fMRI data acquisition 
 Subjects were provided with foam pads and fitted with a thermoplastic mask 
fastened to the head coil to help stabilize head position (note: for 3 subjects, no masks 
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were available. For these subjects, they were held in place with foam and medical tape. 
None of these subjects displayed abnormal amounts of movement as compared with other 
participants in the study). All images were obtained with a Siemens MAGNETOM Tim 
Trio 3.0T Scanner (Erlangen, Germany) using a Siemens 12-channel Matrix Head Coil. 
A T1-weighted sagittal MPRAGE structural image was obtained for each participant (TE 
= 3.08ms, TR(partition) = 2.4s, TI = 1000ms, flip angle = 8 degrees, 176 slices with 1 x 1 
x 1mm voxels) [22]. A T2-weighted turbo spin echo structural image (TE = 84ms, TR = 
6.8s, 32 slices with 2 x 1 x 4mm voxels) in the same anatomical plane as the BOLD 
images was also obtained to improve alignment to an atlas. Gradient field maps were 
collected to estimate inhomogeneities in the magnetic field for each subject. An auto 
align pulse sequence protocol provided in the Siemens software was used to align the 
acquisition slices of the functional scans parallel to the anterior commissure-posterior 
commissure (AC-PC) plane and centered on the brain. Slices collected in this plane are 
parallel to the slices in the Talairach atlas [23], which is used for subsequent data analysis. 
Functional imaging was performed using a BOLD contrast sensitive gradient echo echo-
planar sequence (TE = 27ms, flip angle = 90°, in-plane resolution= 4 x 4mm). Whole 
brain EPI volumes (MR frames) of 32 contiguous, 4mm-thick axial slices were obtained 
every 2.5 seconds. The first four functional image acquisitions of each run were 
discarded to allow for scanner equilibration. 
 Headphones dampened scanner noise and enabled communication with participants. 
An Apple iMac computer (Apple, Cupertino, CA) and PsyScope software [24] were used 
for display of visual stimuli. An LCD projector (Sharp model PG-C20XU) was used to 
project stimuli onto a MRI-compatible rear-projection screen (CinePlex) at the head of 
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the bore, which the participants viewed through a mirror attached to the coil (field of 
view = 21.5 degrees). 
Preprocessing 
 Imaging data from each subject were pre-processed to remove noise and artifacts, 
including: i) correction for movement within and across runs using a rigid-body rotation 
and translation algorithm [25], ii) whole brain normalization to a common mode of 1000 
to allow for comparisons across subjects [26], iii) temporal re-alignment using sinc 
interpolation of all slices to the temporal midpoint of the first slice, accounting for 
differences in slice time acquisition, and iv) gradient field map correction to correct for 
spatial distortions due to local field inhomogeneities using FSL’s FUGUE 
(http://fsl.fMRIb.ox.ac.uk). Functional data were then resampled into 3mm isotropic 
voxels and transformed into stereotaxic atlas space [23]. Atlas registration involved 
aligning each subject’s T1-weighted image to a custom atlas-transformed [27] target T1-
weighted template (711-2B) using a series of affine transforms [28]. 
fMRI analysis based on the GLM 
 Data were modeled using a general linear model (GLM) approach [29]. Briefly, the 
model treats the data at each time point in each voxel as the sum of all effects present at 
that time point. Effects can be produced by events in the model and by error. Estimates of 
the time course of effects were derived from the model for each response category by 
coding time points as a set of delta functions immediately following onset of the coded 
event [18; 19]. The catch trials implemented in the design allow the orientation cue and 
event probe components of each compound trial to be coded separately in our model [18; 
19]. The number of time points modeled in the GLM was 11 for cues and 10 for event 
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probes (27.5 or 25 seconds; event probe onset was 2.5 after cue onset in compound trials). 
For supplemental analyses comparing catch trials and compound trials, each condition 
was modeled with 11 time points; catch trials included “cue only” events, and compound 
trials both the cue set and event probe set were coded into the design matrix as a single 
event. Temporal jitter introduced between trials, combined with the catch trials, provided 
a sufficient number of independent equations to separately model the BOLD response for 
both the orientation cue and event probe time courses, and the ratio of 80% compound to 
20% catch trials is within the guidelines suggested by prior literature [18; 19].    
 The three runs from each participant consisted of 185 frames (189 before discarding 
the first 4 frames of each run), and were concatenated into a single time series of 555 
frames (370 in the case of the single subject who only contributed 2 functional runs). The 
GLM was coded with 6 separate regressors for different trial types (an orientation cue 
and event probe component for REMEMBER, FUTURE, and OBAMA conditions). 
Notably, separate regressors were not included for catch trial orientation cues and for 
compound trial orientation cues. That is, both catch trial cues and compound trial cues for 
the REMEMBER condition were treated as a single trial type, as were both types of cue 
for FUTURE and OBAMA conditions. Cues were combined in this way because 
participants had no way of determining one cue type from another before a trial ended, 
and because separate analysis of cue types produced nearly identical time courses (for 
related discussion, see Wheeler et al. [30]). In addition, each run included a trend term to 
account for linear changes in signal, and a constant term modeled the baseline signal. 
Time courses of the hemodynamic response for each condition were modeled using 10 or 
11 time points, as described above.    
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  Image processing was performed using in-house software (FIDL) written in IDL 
(Research Systems, Inc.). Each participant’s data were resampled into 3 x 3 x 3mm 
stereotaxic atlas space [23] during processing. All Talairach atlas coordinates were 
converted to MNI152 space using in-house software written by Avi Snyder. Statistical 
maps were projected onto a partially inflated surface representation of the human brain 
using CARET software [31], and were projected onto volumes using MRICron [32].  
Voxelwise t-tests  
 Main experimental questions concerned what regions showed changes in activity 
related to orientation cues, and what differences existed during event simulation periods 
when either remembering past events or imagining future events. For orientation-cue 
analysis, we conducted voxelwise t-tests, comparing aggregated activity across all 
orientation cue types to baseline. Activity was binned by time points, averaging activity 
across 2 time points at a time as implemented by FIDL. In addition, we conducted voxel-
wise t-tests between the REMEMBER and FUTURE event probes, aggregating activity 
across the 4th and 5th time points following event probe onset. These time points were 
chosen based on prior studies showing that regions involved in episodic simulation tend 
to peak fairly late (e.g., [7; 9]), and we wished to capture activity levels around the peak 
of the BOLD response.  
 The uncorrected contrast image was smoothed using a 6mm sphere kernel. The 
obtained t-test image was Monte Carlo corrected at a z-score of 3 with at least 17 
contiguous voxels, providing a corrected p < .05 [33]. Regions located in white matter or 
ventricles were removed from the analysis.  
Analysis of time courses 
 15 
 After defining regions from the voxelwise t-test, BOLD activity during the 4th and 
5th time points for the 3 event probe conditions (REMEMBER, FUTURE, and OBAMA) 
within each region were compared using t-tests. While by definition the REMEMBER 
and FUTURE conditions were significantly different in these regions, we were also 
interested in how activity levels differed between these two conditions and the OBAMA 
condition. 
Voxelwise analysis of compound trials for replication of previous work 
 A voxelwise condition x time repeated measures ANOVA, with 3 levels of 
condition (REMEMBER, FUTURE, and OBAMA) and 11 levels of time (11 time points) 
was conducted to compare activity for “compound” trials. This technique allowed for an 
appropriate comparison with previous studies using a similar paradigm to explore 
episodic simulation [7].   
 The uncorrected interaction (condition x time) image for compound trials was 
smoothed using a 6mm sphere kernel. An automated peak-finding algorithm written by 
Avi Snyder searched for the location of peaks exceeding a z-score of 3. Peaks under 
10mm apart were consolidated by averaging coordinates. A 10mm (19 voxel) sphere 
centered on the peak coordinate was used to extract time courses. 
RESULTS 
Behavioral results were consistent with previous studies 
 Behavioral results were broadly consistent with previous studies (for review and 
discussion, see [13] and are summarized in Table 1. Participants rated events in the 
REMEMBER condition as being more generally more vivid, as occurring in more 
familiar locations, and as being easier generate than events in either the FUTURE or 
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OBAMA conditions. FUTURE events were likewise more vivid, occurred in more 
familiar locations, and were easier to generate than events in the OBAMA condition. 
Despite these differences in perceived vividness, scene familiarity, and difficulty, the 
number of events that participants failed to generate did not differ between conditions. 
Unless noted otherwise, behavioral effects were considered significant at p < .05, two-
tailed. Effect sizes were calculated using G*Power3 [34]. 
Vividness 
 A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition for vividness 
(F(2,71) = 33.17, p < .05). Subsequent pairwise testing revealed that subjects rated events 
from the REMEMBER condition as more vivid than those of the FUTURE condition 
(t(46) = 5.24, p < .001, d = 1.52) or events in the OBAMA condition  (t(46) = 8.66, p 
< .001, d = 2.52). Events in the FUTURE condition were also significantly more vivid 
than those events in the OBAMA condition (t(46) = 2.85, p < .01, d = 0.83). 
Scene Familiarity 
 A similar pattern was obtained for reports of scene familiarity. A one-way ANOVA 
revealed a significant effect of condition (F(2,71) = 26.59, p < .001). Subsequent 
pairwise testing revealed that subjects rated the settings of events from the REMEMBER 
condition as more familiar than those of the FUTURE condition (t(46) = 3.88, p < .001, d 
= 1.11) and OBAMA condition (t(46) = 11.31, p < .001, d = 3.25). Event locations in the 
FUTURE condition were significantly more familiar than those events in the OBAMA 
condition (t(46) = 5.70, p < .001, d = 1.63). 
Difficulty 
 Difficulty in forming a scenario mentally followed the same pattern as was 
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observed for vividness and scene familiarity. The one-way ANOVA was significant 
(F(2,71) = 53.1, p < .001), and pairwise testing revealed that simulating events in the 
REMEMBER condition was less difficult than events for the FUTURE condition (t(46) = 
-3.68, p < .001, d = 1.07) or OBAMA condition (t(46) = -8.24, p < .001, d = 2.38), and 
events in the FUTURE condition were significantly easier to form than those events in 
the OBAMA condition (t(46) = -3.30, p < .01, d = 0.96).  
Event generation failures 
 While events in different conditions were, on average, rated differently in their 
phenomenological characteristics, they did not differ in how frequently subjects reported 
being unable to generate events for different conditions; the ANOVA did not reveal any 
significant differences (F(2,71) < 1).  
Whole brain t-tests reveal regions showing activations and deactivations related to 
orientation cue presentation. 
 Areas of activation related to orientation cue onset (t-tested against zero) are 
showin in Figure 3. Regions showing early responses to orientation cues show task-
induced activations and fall within visual cortex and the fronto-parietal control network  
[35]. Later responses also include task-induced deactivations, and these fall within areas 
commonly considered to be a part of the default network [36-38]. 
SEM = standard error of the mean 
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Figure 3. Statistical maps of cue-related activity across all cue types during several time windows. Cue-induced 
activations tend to occur rapidly following cue-onset, while deactivations occur several time points later. Each 
bin represents activity aggregated across 2 MR frames, as estimated using an FIR model. t values were 
converted to z-scores and projected onto a cortical surface using CARET software [31]. 
Whole-brain t-tests reveal 3 regions that show differences between REMEMBER 
and FUTURE event simulation 
 The primary comparison of interest is the voxelwise t-test of REMEMBER and 
FUTURE event probes. These results are shown in Fig. 4a. Three ROIs emerge after 
Monte Carlo correction, demonstrating significantly more activity for REMEMBER than 
FUTURE event probe periods. These ROIs were located in bilateral posterior 
parahippocampal cortex (PHC) and in the right retrosplenial cortex (Rsp). No regions 
were located demonstrating significantly greater activity for FUTURE than for 
REMEMBER conditions. 
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Time course analysis of regions showing preferential activity for remembering 
 Time courses were extracted for the three ROIs identified in the t-test analysis. 
Pairwise comparisons were then made between each condition in each ROI. While by 
definition the activity is significantly different between REMEMBER and FUTURE 
conditions in these ROIs (as that is how they were defined), it is notable that activity for 
REMEMBER probes is greater than for OBAMA probes in all 3 regions (see Fig. 4b; 
Table 2). Furthermore, no significant differences emerged between the FUTURE and 
OBAMA conditions in any of the three ROIs.  
 Time course analysis reveals deactivation, relative to baseline, for the orientation 
cue component of trials (Figs 3; 4b) in both the left PHC (t(23) = -2.92, p < .01, d = 1.20) 
Figure 4. Regions identified in voxelwise t-test showing differential activity for REMEMBER and FUTURE 
conditions. A) Voxel clusters surviving Monte Carlo correction consist of regions in bilateral 
parahippocampal cortex and right retrosplenial cortex, projected onto a partially inflated CARET brain 
surface [31]. B) Time courses extracted from these regions show preferential activation for events in the 
REMEMBER condition. In addition, these regions show slight deactivation in response to the orientation cue. 
C) A volumetric view of the activations in each region, using MRIcron [32]. 
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and right Rsp (t(23) = -2.79, p < .05, 
d = 1.16) regions, and no significant 
deviation from baseline activity in 
the right PHC region (t(23) = -1.56, 
p = .13). Furthermore, for reach 
region, activity related to the 
orientation cue was significant 
different than activity related to the 
event probe (left PHC (t(23) = -5.08, 
p < .001, d  = 2.12); right PHC = 
(t(23) = -2.37, p < .05, d = 0.99); 
right Rsp (t(23) = -6.15, p < .001, d 
= 2.57)). In other words, for two of the three regions identified in the previous t-test, the 
time course of the BOLD activity associated with the orientation cue was negative, even 
though the activity related to the event probe component of the trial was positive, and for 
all regions, cue-related responses were significantly different than responses to event 
probes. Cue-related activity is shown as an average across all conditions because a 
condition x time ANOVA did not reveal any significant effects in any of the three regions. 
An analysis of variance for the compound trials replicates previous results 
 Results from the voxelwise condition x time ANOVA for compound trials are 
shown in Fig. 5. Broadly speaking, the statistical map obtained in the current study (Fig. 
5b) overlaps with the map obtained by Szpunar et al. ([7]; Fig. 5a), indicating that 
participants were not substantially changing the manner in which they approached the 
PHC = Parahippocampal Cortex; Rsp = Retrosplenial Cortex. 
Region coordinates (x, y, z): L PHC (-27, -44, -7); R PHC (17, -41,   
-9); R Rsp (19, -58, 21). 
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experimental task, despite deviations from 
previous methods.  
Examination of separated cue and probe time 
courses in other regions identified by Szpunar 
et al. [7]  
 The finding that orientation cue and event 
probe time courses were of opposite directions in 
several ROIs prompted us to examine other 
regions identified by Szpunar et al. as being 
involved in episodic simulation [7] that also 
came out of our compound trial ANOVA. We 
selected a region in left superior frontal gyrus 
and a region in ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(Fig. 6a). We compared the time courses 
extracted using compound trial and separated 
cue and event probe analyses. Orientation cues was were associated with deactivations 
relative to baseline for both the superior frontal (t(23) = -4.22, p < .001, d = 1.76) and 
ventromedial prefrontal (t(23) = -3.14, p < .01, d = 1.30) regions (Figs. 6b, 6c). 
Consequently, by separately modeling the cue, the event probe activity increased in each 
region for each condition. As with the bilateral PHC and right Rsp region, no differences 
were found between different orientation cue conditions; the condition x time ANOVAs 
were not significant. 
Figure 5. Statistical maps based on compound 
trial analysis replicate those reported previously. 
A) The voxelwise condition x time ANOVA map 
reported by Szpunar et al. [7], from a task in 
which participants were asked to remember 
events from their own past, imagine events from 
their own futures, or imagine Bill Clinton 
participating in events. B) A voxelwise condition 
x time ANOVA map from the present study, 
using compound trials, in which participants 
remembered events from their own past, 
imagined events from their own futures, or 
imagined Barack Obama participating in events. 
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DISCUSSION 
Summary 
 This study replicates and extends previous work focusing on the neural correlates of 
episodic simulation. Specifically, this current report demonstrates separable components 
within a typical simulation trial: BOLD activity in response to a presented orientation cue 
was separated from BOLD activity in response to the act of simulation itself. This novel 
approach revealed that the time courses associated with these components were of 
Figure 6. Regions outside of those obtained in the t-test analysis show time courses of opposite directions 
during episodic simulation tasks. A) Sample regions were selected from left superior frontal gyrus and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. B & C) By separating orientation cue-related activity from event probe-related 
activity, one can observe time courses going in opposing directions around baseline, suggesting multiple, 
temporally overlapping processes. Offloading the orientation cue therefore provides a more pure observation of 
the signal related to event probe simulation. SFG = superior frontal gyrus; vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex. 
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opposing directions across a number of regions previously implicated in episodic 
simulation. By effectively offloading the cue component, we found that regions involved 
in simulation might show BOLD responses were of greater magnitude than has 
previously been assumed (Fig. 6). In addition, we found for the first time in an episodic 
simulation paradigm regions that showed more activity when recalling past events than 
imagining future events (Fig. 4).  
Replicated previous work 
 An important check when in attempting to apply a catch trial design to episodic 
simulations was the change in how participants were shown stimuli. Whereas in all 
previous studies orientation cues and event probes were shown simultaneously, in this 
experiment we temporally separated the two components such that participants saw the 
orientation cue prior to being shown the event probe. In order to ensure that this 
difference in presentation did not significantly alter how participants engaged in the task, 
we based our catch trial design on a well-characterized paradigm used by Szpunar et al. 
[7]. When modeling compound trials together and conducting an ANOVA to compare 
activity across REMEMBER, FUTURE, and OBAMA conditions, we found highly 
similar statistical maps (Fig. 5). This basic check does not guarantee that participants 
behaved identically in this study to the earlier Szpunar et al. study (i.e., some differences 
may still be induced by showing orientation cues and event probes separately), but it does 
suggest that any differences we observed when separating cue and event probe activity 
were true differences, and not an artifact of differences in how stimuli were presented. 
Differences in orientation cue and event probe time courses 
 A comparison of the time courses of orientation cue- and event probe-related 
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activity  ROIs implicated in episodic simulation demonstrates that whereas the BOLD 
signal related to event simulation itself is positive, orientation-related signals are typically 
slightly negative (i.e., orientation is associated with deactivation in regions engaged 
during episodic simulation). This negative response was fairly sluggish, peaking 
relatively late in each trial (about 12.5 seconds after cue onset; the same TR in which the 
event probe activity also typically peaked). The relatively small, slow response to 
orientation cues effectively reduced the observed BOLD response to all types of 
simulation trials. No significant differences in orientation cue activity were found in this 
report. Given the relatively small number of catch trials incorporated in the design, it is 
possible that these null effects are a result of a lack of sufficient power relating to the 
orientation cue signal, especially given the pattern of numerical differences observed in 
ROIs identified in the REMEMBER > FUTURE contrast (Fig. 4). While our proportions 
of compound trials to catch trials was consistent with that suggested by the literature [18], 
it is reasonable to suspect that the absolute number of trials was too small to allow us to 
directly compare activity across cue conditions. Future work will be necessary to 
examine this cue component of simulation trials to better understand different regional 
BOLD responses sensitive to different “modes” or task sets, which appears to be a critical 
next step in understanding processing differences between types of mental simulation 
task. 
Cue-related activity can distort the BOLD signal related to event simulation 
 Despite the lack of power to statistically test for differences between orientation-
related BOLD activity, the fact that it was consistently negative is informative from a 
theoretical standpoint. Regions commonly engaged by episodic simulation tasks, such as 
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medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and retrosplenial cortex, fall within 
what is known as the default network ([36; 37], see also [38]). Regions within the default 
network were initially identified as being consistently less active during a variety of task 
conditions than during periods of awake rest [36; 39]. More recent characterizations tend 
to suggest that default regions can be activated above baseline levels when one’s 
attention is directed internally (as in a memory retrieval task) rather than externally (as 
during a variety of visuospatial tasks) (for recent discussion, see [40; 41]).  
 Deactivations observed in this study during orientation cue periods occur in a 
variety of default regions, and may suggest that while one is preparing to think about 
either the past or the future (e.g., when one is entering a retrieval mode), default regions 
are nevertheless sensitive to the orientation to the words on the screen. That is, despite 
attention being turned inward in preparation to perform a memory task, the dominant 
BOLD response during orientation across a number of default regions is a slight 
deactivation. This should highlight the importance of separating orientation signals from 
other task-related signals, not only in our own paradigm but in memory studies more 
broadly.  
 In addition, while orientation cue conditions did not significantly differ from one 
another in this study, it should be stressed that they were not numerically equivalent. As 
such, removing them did not simply remove a constant and globally inflate all event 
probe activity time courses to an equal degree. These slight differences in orientation-
related activity may differentially affect each event probe condition, which may explain 
why in previous studies the ROIs identified in PHC and Rsp were not observed. 
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A small network of regions in posteromedial cortex and the medial temporal lobe 
supports “true remembering” in episodic simulation 
 In this study, only bilateral PHC and right Rsp regions emerged as showing greater 
activity for REMEMBER than FUTURE event probes. PHC and Rsp have been 
identified as a functionally-coupled unit using both functional and resting-state fMRI 
techniques (for recent review, see [42]; for resting-state descriptions see [43; 44]). fMRI 
studies that have shown coactivation of these regions tend to involve some form of 
contextual processing. PHC and Rsp tend to activate more in episodic memory studies 
when one can recollect specific contextual details, as in successful retrieval of source 
memory information (e.g., [45]). Evidence from the neuropsychology literature suggests 
that patients suffering damage to Rsp show retrograde amnesia, with symptoms similar to 
those in hippocampal patients [46], and it appears as though both Rsp and the 
hippocampus are highly interconnected anatomically [47; 48]. This literature lends 
converging support to the characterization of Rsp as being involved in episodic memory 
retrieval.  
 Beyond the realm of episodic memory, PHC and Rsp have been linked to spatial 
processing, spatial memory, and navigation. One hypothesis is that these two regions 
represent complementary information within these domains, with the PHC representing 
visusospatial information (e.g., the “layout” of a scene; [49]), and the Rsp providing a 
means of utilizing this information to orient oneself in space [50]. It has also been 
demonstrated in a parallel line of research that objects that are typically restricted to 
specific spatial contexts tend to activate both PHC and Rsp more strongly than objects 
that may occur across a variety of contexts (e.g., [51; 52]). It seems therefore that these 
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regions enable one to mentally navigate 3-dimensional spaces, either when provided with 
example scenes or when generating them internally (for further discussion, see [42]).  
PHC and Rsp activity has previously been implicated in episodic simulation  
 In addition to the above, both PHC and Rsp have been implicated in retrieving 
autobiographical memories (e.g., [53; 54]) and in episodic simulation tasks (e.g., [7; 9]). 
An important observation from a study by Szpunar et al. [9] demonstrated greater PHC 
and Rsp activity for imagining oneself in familiar rather than unfamiliar contexts. 
Combined with the above characterization of PHC and Rsp as a functional module 
involved in spatial and contextual processing, it seems reasonable to assert that PHC and 
Rsp are acting during simulation to construct an episode within a particular contextual 
environment, a sentiment recently echoed in a review by Ranganath and Ritchey [42].  
 Given this putative functional role, our findings of greater activity for remembered 
event periods than imagined future periods begins to make sense. Remembered events 
will necessarily have more recollective detail than will imagined future events, or 
imagined events involving President Obama. To the extent that these details will provide 
a richer “mental landscape” for events, more activity should be elicited selectively for the 
Remember conditions. 
 This conclusion is partially supported by subjective ratings. Remembered events 
tended to be more vivid and occur in more familiar locations than did imagined events, 
either of one’s future or involving President Obama. However, subjective reports also 
suggested that imagined future events were more detailed and occurred in more familiar 
locations than did imagined events involving President Obama, and no such difference 
was observed in the BOLD response in any of our ROIs (in fact, in R PHC, the opposite 
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pattern was observed numerically). This may be due to the manner in which the 
subjective reports were collected, as retrospective ratings after subjects left the scanner. 
Although previous work has demonstrated them to be reliable [7], they may not contain 
enough fine-grained information to accurately reflect activity in any of our obtained 
regions. A supplemental set of analyses regressed out each phenomenological measure 
from the obtained BOLD signal, and results were indistinguishable pre- and post-
regression for any factor. Given that other reports have shown relationships between 
subjective reports of “reliving” and activity in Rsp [55], it remains for future work to 
clarify the relationship between subjective experiences and BOLD activity in our ROIs. 
t-tests revealed no areas in which FUTURE conditions show greater activity than 
REMEMBER conditions 
 Another notable feature of our results is the lack of regions showing greater activity 
for events in the FUTURE than in the REMEMBER conditions. Although numerically 
FUTURE conditions elicited more activity in some regions previously identified as 
showing greater activity for imagined than remembered events (e.g, a region in left SFG; 
see Fig. 6; [7; 9; 53]), no statistically reliable differences were found anywhere in the 
brain. There are several possible reasons for failing to obtain results commonly found in 
the extant literature. 
 One possibility, discussed above, is that activity related to the orientation cue is 
slightly different between REMEMBER and FUTURE conditions, such that many 
regions deactivate slightly more in response to the REMEMBER cue than FUTURE cue. 
If the cue were not offloaded from the event probe, then it would appear as though 
greater activity was elicited for compound FUTURE trials than compound REMEMBER 
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trials. This observed difference would be in line with previous observations, but would 
imply that the simulation processes are not different between remembered and imagined 
events of oneself in time. Instead, differences in the mental set adopted to perform these 
operations would be what caused them to appear as differ in previous experiments. This 
possibility is intriguing, but results from the current study cannot speak to significant 
differences between orientation cue conditions. Future research, focused on examining 
this orientation component, will be necessary to assess the utility of this explanation. 
 A second possibility is that sampling variability within our study was greater than 
in some previous studies. This is a fairly uninteresting possibility, but it may be the case, 
and future replication of the present results will speak further to this possibility’s utility. 
 A final possibility is that the subtle differences between our study and previous 
methods is responsible for the lack of regions demonstrating greater activity for 
REMEMBER and FUTURE conditions (Fig. 4). Despite our attempt to ensure that 
participants were not changing how they approached this task as compared to previous 
tasks (Table 1; Fig. 5), it may be the case that separating orientation cue and event probe 
instructions across two frames changed certain task parameters. For instance, as 
compared to [7], separating instructions as we did may have changed the amount of time 
spent generating an event as compared to simulating it. Since no reaction times were 
collected, no answer to this possibility exists in the current experiment. To the extent that 
including catch trials did change participant behavior in some way, future studies 
employing a design similar to that used here will clarify what these differences may be, 
and how they affected the present results. 
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Final conclusions 
In sum, the data presented here present an intriguing possibility about the 
relationship between BOLD activity related to adopting specific mental sets when 
engaging in different mental simulation tasks, and the activity related to actually carrying 
out the mental simulations. By “offloading” the orientation cue component of the signal, 
we observed novel differences that have never before been observed as participants 
simulated different types of events, showing greater activity for remembered than for 
imagined events, and these differences could not be explained simply by subjective 
experience ratings. Future work will have to clarify the role of the orientation-cue as one 
approaches these different simulation tasks. 
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